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Abstract
This is a theoretical paper which aims to integrate various epistemologies from the philosophical,  
knowledge  management,  cognitive  science,  and  educational  perspectives.  From  a  survey  of  
knowledge-related  literature,  we  have  collated  diverse  views  of  knowledge.  This  is  followed  by  
categorising as well as ascribing attributes to the different types of knowledge. We have developed a  
novel  Organisational  Information  and Knowledge  Management  Model  which  seeks  to  clarify  the  
distinctions between information and knowledge by introducing a novel information and knowledge  
conversions; followed by providing mechanisms for individual knowledge creation and information  
sharing within an organisation. 
Keywords:  Seminal,  Epistemology,  Knowledge  Management  System,  Conversions,  Knowledge  
Creation, Information Sharing, Learning, Rationalist,  Empirical, Pragmatic, Cognitive, Pluralistic,  
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1. Introduction
Epistemology is the study of knowledge which includes what it is and how it is acquired. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1995) emphasise the need to understand what knowledge is, know how to manage it, and 
exploit  it  to  increase  an  organisation’s  competitive  advantage.  They  view  every  member  in  an 
organisation as knowledge workers where new knowledge always begins with an individual which can 
then be transformed into organisational ‘knowledge’. In this paper, we would like to address a few 
issues.  Firstly,  there is a  need to revisit  seminal  epistemology and unify them with contemporary 
epistemology so as to uncover the elusive meaning of knowledge. Secondly, there is general lack of 
consensus over tacit and explicit knowledge as well as information and knowledge, which will affect 
knowledge  management  in  organisations.  To  address  these  two  issues,  we  have  developed  an 
Organisational Information and Knowledge Management Model to tease out the differences between 
information  and  knowledge  for  an  organisation’s  benefits,  and  have  provided  mechanisms  for 
individual knowledge creation and information sharing among individuals within the organisation.
2. Epistemology 
2.1 Seminal Epistemology
2.1.1 Rationalist Approach
According  to  Plato’s  rationalist  approach  to  epistemology,  knowledge  is  justified  true  belief  or 
unshakeable conviction (Descartes in Newman, 2005) which is attained through reason alone. Such 
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type of a priori knowledge which is independent of sense experience, could be innate knowledge or 
acquired through intuition and deduction. Popper (in Thornton, 2006) claimed that scientists begin 
with problems rather than observations and he attributed the growth of human knowledge to the search 
of solutions (involving the formulation of theories) which correspond to these problems. However, 
creative imagination which transcends the existing knowledge is required when current theories are 
inadequate to account for anomalies. 
2.1.2 Empiricist Approach
Empiricists argue that humans have no innate knowledge, the human mind is a blank slate (tabula  
rasa) and claim that experience is a source of  a posteriori knowledge (e.g. Aristotle (in Hett, 1936) 
and John Locke(1689)). Empiricists like Locke (1689) argue that human experience comes in the form 
of sensation and reflection where the former subsumes external senses (e.g. vision, smell, hearing, 
taste,  and touch) and inner sensations (e.g.  pain, joy,  anxiety,  etc…) which informs one about the 
things and processes in one’s external world.  On the other hand, reflection informs one about the 
operations of one’s mind. Locke also argued that the outcome of our mental processes is ideas which 
are considered as the materials of knowledge. According to him, simple ideas cannot be created but 
can only be obtained from experience.  However, when the mind has a repository of  simple ideas 
which when reflected on (or  applied reasoning to),  will  result  in a variety of  complex ideas that 
transcend  beyond  our  experience.  Empirical  (or  scientific)  methods  are  employed  to  collect  data 
through the observation of these physical phenomena, analyse them followed by the derivation of laws 
or theories. 
2.1.3 Pragmatic Approach 
Peirce (in Atkin, 2006) viewed pragmatism as a principle of inquiry and account of meaning where 
meaningful propositions or ideas must have practical bearings. Theoretical claims (or hypotheses) are 
coupled with verification practices to test the truth of existing knowledge. However, to pragmatists, 
ultimate truth is not attainable so existing truth is always changeable. The inquiry methods suggested 
by them resemble  the  typical  scientific  methods  which  constitute  the  following  cycle  of  actions: 
formulation  of  hypotheses,  testing  of  hypotheses,  draw  conclusions  from  the  tests  or  provide 
explanations for the observed effects followed by reformulation of hypotheses and so on and forth (as 
shown in Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Scientific Method of Inquiry
According to Peirce (in Burch, 2006), the three types of reasoning involved in scientific methods are: 
abductive,  deductive  and  inductive  reasoning.  Abduction  entails  the  inference  of  some  form  of 
plausible explanation which is considered the best explanation for the current state of knowledge for 
an  unexpected  or  anomalous  observed  effect.  Such  explanation  is  considered  a  conjecture  or 
hypothesis  whose  truth  is  not  ensured.  On  the  other  hand,  for  deduction,  the  conclusions  are 
necessitated by previously known theories where inferences are being made from general principles to 
particular  cases.  To  Peirce,  deduction  is  a  means  of  drawing  conclusions  about  the  expected 
observable  effects  given the  hypothesis  is  true or  drawing conclusions  based on a set  of  facts  or 
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supposed facts known as suppositions. Shanahan (1989) defines the roles of abduction and deduction 
in Cognitive Robotics:  the former, for explanation which is a backward projection from effects to 
causes while the latter is employed for prediction, a form of forward projection from causes to effects. 
As for induction, it involves the testing (confirmation or refutation) of hypotheses and the drawing of 
inferences to generate hypotheses or generalisations. However, inductive inferences can be used to 
classifying observations of specific observations into categories, thus resulting in the acquisition of the 
knowledge of concepts as well as categories. A pragmatic approach could be viewed as a bridge of the 
rational and empirical approaches which are mutually exclusive but are complementary to each other. 
Peirce viewed pragmatism as a theory of clarifying concepts (things, events, and qualities) and he 
introduced a maxim or a principle which allows us to better understand concepts that we use. The 
three pre-requisites for fully understanding a concept are: firstly, the particular concept ought to be 
familiar and saturates our daily experience, secondly, the ability to abstract and provide a definition for 
that concept facilitated by language, and finally, the ability to predict the effects when a concept is 
held  to  be  true.  However,  Dewey  (1960)  maintained  that  ‘understanding’ is  demonstrated  when 
various parts of a concept/s are ‘grasped in their relations to one another are grasped in their relations 
to one another through reflection. 
Kant argued that the human mind is an active originator of phenomenal experience by systematically 
structuring its representations rather than a passive recipient of perception (in Ross, 2000-2002). He 
(in McCormick, 2006) claims that knowledge about the world is not attributed to sense perceptions 
alone but due to the operations on perceptual inputs by the mind based on innate rules, principles, or 
categories that facilitate understanding. James (1890) in his book The Principles of Psychology, named 
analysis  and  synthesis  as  examples  of  such  mental  operations  where  the  former  is  a  process  of 
breaking down of objects which appear as wholes in the first instance, into their parts while the latter, 
bringing together objects which appear separately, and combine them as new compound wholes. He 
also applied the Law of Contiguity to support his claim that that objects that are experienced together 
have the tendency of being associated in the mind. James also added that not everything presented to 
our senses will be converted to experience due to selective attention. Some attention can be immediate 
(where a new percept is novel) or derived (or apperceptive where a new percept is related to a known 
percept). Kant postulated that knowledge has form or structure due to the structure of the mind that 
facilitates the unification or integration of concepts into judgements and content which is provided by 
the interaction of the mind with the world (Ross, 2000-2002). Both Kant and James (in Goodman, 
2006) viewed the mind as possessing a priori templates for judgements (or values) and categories but 
not  a priori judgements.  According  to  James,  knowledge  could  grow or  change  through  rational 
processes, empirical discoveries or introspection (e.g. reflection put forth by Dewey, 1960) which is an 
inward process. These processes can be illustrated by a modified Kolb’s experiential learning cycle 
(Kolb and Fry,  1975) which is shown in Figure 2 (note:  learning is  synonymous with knowledge 
acquisition in this paper).
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Figure 2: Knowledge growth or change cycle based on the Pragmatic Approach
2.1.4 Social Approach
A scientific community is viewed as a group of individuals that are committed to the sharing of their 
theoretical beliefs, values, instruments, and techniques. Kuhn (1962) highlighted the significant role of 
such scientific community in effecting a revolution of scientific theories which is not possible with the 
mere  accrual  of  facts.  He  explained  that  the  scientific  community  has  an  established  coherent 
framework of scientific thought (called paradigm) which constitutes stable and consistent conjectures, 
theories,  or  practice.  Normal science  that  occurs  within  such a  framework is  not  dramatic  and it 
develops by the addition of new truths to the stock of old truths, or the increasing approximation of 
theories to the truth, and the ratification of past errors. However, a paradigm is considered stretched 
when it is ridden with anomalies where numerous observed phenomena cannot be accounted for and 
then a crisis is said to occur. In such a situation, Kuhn continued, the community of scientists needs 
bold (or active) individuals who will explore alternatives which are considered rivals to the existing 
established framework of thought. This new potential but immature paradigm will initially seem to be 
accompanied by numerous anomalies due to its incompleteness and there will be no consensus on the 
emerging theories or methods which include verification rules. Consequently, it will be opposed by the 
majority  of  the  scientific  community.  However,  scientists  who  could  recognise  the  would-be 
paradigm’s  potential  will  be  the  first  to  shift  in  favour  of  the  challenging  paradigm.  When  it  is 
solidified as well as unified and widely accepted by the community, then it is ready to replace the old 
paradigm, and thus a paradigm shift is said to have occurred. The paradigm shift will entail a general 
consensus on radical new world views, the transformation of theories, changes in definitions of terms, 
verification rules and etc.
2.2 Contemporary Epistemology 
In this section, we shall address two views of epistemology: one being from the cognitive approach 
(adapted  from Kor,  2001)  while  the  other,  knowledge  management  which  plays  a  pivotal  role  in 
fostering knowledge creation, codification, sharing, and diffusion.
2.2.1 Cognitive Approach
The essential elements in Piaget’s stage-independent theory of cognitive development addressed in this 
paper are: schema, assimilation, accommodation, and equilibrium.  Schemata, according to Piaget, are 
internal  mental  structures which depict  the way a person represents the world through perception, 
understanding and thoughts (Hill, 1990). When a piece of information is similar but not identical to a 
learner’s  inherent  knowledge  structure,  it  will  be  assimilated  by the  existing  cognitive  structure. 
During this assimilation process, two changes will take place simultaneously. The first pertains to the 
stimulus itself while the second is the schema. The stimulus will be modified and, at the same time, 
the  schema changes  to  accommodate  the  new input.  The various  ways  of  accommodating a  new 
experience as outlined by Papert (1980) are abandoning the old or new knowledge, modify one or the 
other, or place both in separate compartments. When the conflict between the contradictory old and 
new knowledge has been resolved then equilibrium is said to have occurred. The schemata, in such a 
situation, are found to be in a stable state.  Mendelson (1996) maintains that the notion of conflict is 
used as a tool to foster a conceptual change. However, if an incoming piece of information is either 
exactly the same or totally different from an existing mental structure then it will have no influence on 
the schema (Piaget in Mayer, 1992). The reason being the former is nothing new so will not be a 
stimulus of change while the latter can neither be understood nor encoded, thus failing to relate to the 
existing knowledge framework. Three views of conceptual change are as follows: 
Schema change (Rumelhart  & Norman,  1977).  A cluster  of  related  concepts  is  referred  to  a 
schema and is liken as a schema as a kind of tree structure in which subschemata correspond to 
subtrees.  They  classify  three  types  of  learning  that  can  occur  within  a  schema  framework: 
accretion  which  occurs  within  existing  schemata  through  the  gradual  addition  of  factual 
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information interpreted in terms of relevant pre-existing schemata; tuning which involves the slow 
modification and refinement of schemata through continual use and, presumably, it is instrumental 
for the development of expertise; and structuring involves the creation of new schemata to account 
for new information. 
Theory change (Carey, 1985; Vosniadou, 1995). A theory structure differs from schemata in that it 
provides  a  causal  explanatory  framework  within  which  a  phenomenon  it  describes  can  be 
understood (Vosniadou, 1995). In domain-specific theory change, Carey (1985) proposes a few 
possible  changes:  change  in  the  individual  concepts  that  make  up  the  theory,  change  in  the 
relationships between the concepts, and change in the scope of the phenomena that the theory 
explains. Vosniadou’s (1995) notion of theory change appears to be an extension of Carey’s work 
when she further describes the changes in terms of theory enrichment through addition or theory 
restructuring through deletion or modification.
Mental model change. A mental model is perceived as a form of knowledge structure (Gentner & 
Stevens, 1983) while some see it as a transient representation which is constructed on the spot to 
deal  with  a  particular  situation  (Johnson-Laird,  1983;  Vosniadou  et  al.  1999).  According  to 
Vosniadou et  al.  (1999),  such a representation can be manipulated mentally to provide causal 
explanations for physical phenomena and make predictions about the causal effects of the physical 
world. Mental models change in different ways as a result of learning and the change in a mental 
model  is  either  of  the  mental  model  itself  or  in  the  underlying  structures  that  constrain  it 
(Vosniadou, 1995).  
2.2.2 Knowledge Management Approach: Pluralist Epistemology
The pluralist epistemology recognises the existence of more than one type of human knowledge which 
interacts with each other. The term is first used by Spender (1996) to capture the different types of 
knowledge that an organization uses (e.g. knowledge that is held individual or collectively). Based on 
existing  Knowledge  Management  literature  pluralist  epistemology could  be  classified  into  the 
following categories:
Dichotomy  Model  of  Knowledge:  This  model  which  is  prevalent,  has  been  the  subject  of 
extensive debate and our discussion here will only focus on the typical categories of knowledge 
being explicit  knowledge and tacit  (or  sometimes known as implicit,  a term used by Polanyi, 
1967)  where  the  former  is  formal,  systematic,  and  can  be  quantified,  captured,  codified  (or 
structured), stored, reused, and disseminated. Typical examples of explicit knowledge that have 
been given include product specifications, codified procedures, a scientific formula, principle, or a 
computer  programme.  On  the  contrary,  tacit  knowledge  is  not  easily  captured,  expressible, 
codified,  communicated,  nor  shared.  It  is  often  associated  with  deeply  rooted  actions  or 
experiential  knowledge that  resides  in the  heads of  the  knower (Nonaka and Takeuchi,  1995; 
Spender, 1998; Davenport and Prusak, 1998). According to Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), both 
explicit and tacit knowledge are dichotomous yet mutually complementary and interact with each 
other in the knowledge conversion process. There is no general consensus about the explicit and 
tacit  knowledge.  Although  the  Spiral  Model  of  Knowledge  (Nonaka  and  Takeuchi,  1995)  is 
considered a piece of seminal work in Knowledge Management, its knowledge conversion process 
(from tacit to explicit and vice versa) is critiqued (Hildreth et al, 2002; Tsoukas, 2005) based on 
Polanyi’s (1967) stance that tacit knowledge is  ineffable which is ascribed to something that is 
known but can only be described very vaguely.
Multiple  Model  of  Knowledge: Choo  (1998)  extends  the  explicit-tacit  model  by  including 
cultural knowledge to explicate organisational knowledge. The three categories of knowledge are 
interdependent and cultural knowledge constitutes cognitive and affective structures utilised for 
perception and justification purposes.  Also, it is said to include assumption, beliefs, and values 
about the organisation and its environment. Boisot (1995) classifies knowledge into four different 
categories. The first is  proprietary knowledge developed by an individual or a group, which is 
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context specific, can be codified but not completely diffused because it becomes not meaningful 
when it  is  utilised  in  a  different  context.  Next  is  idiosyncratic  personal  knowledge which is 
derived from personal  experiences  and thus  cannot  be  codified  nor diffused.  On the  contrary, 
public knowledge can both be codified and diffused in the form of textbooks or other printed 
resources. Lastly, commonsense knowledge which is social-contextual personal experiences that 
have been internalised, its ownership and meaning are shared by the community and thus, can be 
diffused but not codified. Spender (1996) also suggests four categories of knowledge: conscious 
knowledge which is  explicit  knowledge held  by an individual;  objectified  knowledge which 
refers  to  explicit  knowledge  held  by  the  organisation;  automatic  knowledge (pre-conscious 
individual knowledge) which experience is linked to intuition where experts linked experience to 
intuition where experts arrive at solutions without being able to explain how or the reasoning bit 
Davenport  and  Prusak  (1998);  collective  knowledge,  which  is  highly  context  specific  (like 
Boisot’s  proprietary knowledge),  is  manifested  through the  practice  of  the  organisation (as  in 
Boisot’s commonsense knowledge).
Continuum Model of Knowledge: Polanyi (1967) and Leonard et. al (1998) present knowledge 
in a continuum model where one extreme end of the spectrum is a completely explicit form of 
knowledge (conscious) while the other end is,  completely tacit (unconscious and experiential). 
Leonard et al  argue that most knowledge lies between these two polarised points of extremes. 
According to Polanyi, in an ineffable domain, we know something in our heads but find it beyond 
our description. The reasons for such ineffability, in Polanyi’s point of view, are due to defective  
articulation and also the inability to  co-ordinate  the essential  elements  in  a  coherent  manner. 
Tsoukas (2005) views organisational knowledge as a continuum with propositional knowledge on 
one end while, narrative knowledge on the other. 
Duality Model of Knowledge: As for Hildreth et al (2002), they come up with a duality model of 
the  hard and  soft (basically  synonymous  with  the  explicit  and  tacit  terms  which  has  been 
previously  discussed)  of  knowledge  which  looks  like  the  Chinese  ying  yang symbol.  They 
maintain that these two forms co-exist and interwoven in all knowledge but with varying degree 
and in other words, knowledge is to some degree both  hard and  soft and thus categorisation of 
knowledge is not needed. Additionally, both are considered mutually dependent viewing the fact 
that when one increases, the other decreases. 
The  KNOWING Model  of  Knowledge: Polanyi  (1962,  p.vii)  regards  knowing as  ‘an  active 
comprehension  of  the  things  known  and  action  that  requires  skill’.  The  component  active  
comprehension refers to the formulation and application of theories (e.g. a set of rules considered 
as maxims or rules of thumb (Davenport and Prusak, 1998) which provide guidance for the doing 
followed by the  interpretation  of  the  experience.  Polanyi  gives  an  example  of  science  which 
consists  of  a  set  of  formulae  that  have  a  bearing  on  experience  and  without  the  exercise  of 
operational skills on these formulae, which will be guided by maxims, there will be no shaping of 
a  scientist’s  knowledge.  Another  example  given  is  the  rules  of  art  that  do not  determine  the 
practice of art but merely serve as beacons to an art only if they can be integrated into practical 
knowledge of art. Seely Brown and Duguid (1998) add a social dimension to knowing by claiming 
that it not only focuses on what that is in the heads but the interactions with the things in the social 
and physical world.  They classify knowledge into the know-what (explicit knowledge) and know-
how (which can have an explicit component) which is  overlapping model. The  know-what-it-is-
like encompasses knowledge derived from sensations. Know-how or also known as things you do 
with  knowledge (Davenport  and  Prusak,  1998),  relates  to  the  procedural  uses  of  knowledge, 
represents the possession of a skill (Scheffler, 1965). He makes a distinction between this know-
how (having a skill) and knowing that a skill is such and such (i.e. information about the skill). 
Also, he continues to claim that understanding or appreciation of a  know-how  is  non-existent. 
However,  skills  can  generally  be  honed  through  practice  but  one  cannot  practice  know-that. 
Practice will effect an increase in certain skills to the point when it could be automatic. Know-that 
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involves the propositional uses of knowledge and Scheffler (1965) not only views it as a verified 
belief but one which entails the ability to appropriately justify the belief.
A summary of the discussed seminal and contemporary epistemologies including the attributes  of 
various categories of knowledge have been tabulated in Table 1.
3. Organisational Information and Knowledge Management Model
Seeing that  knowledge is  empowerment and it  enhances  an organisation’s  competitive  advantage, 
organisational knowledge theorists and practitioners stress the need to know what knowledge is and 
how to manage as well as exploit it. This is the reason why the KM field has in recent years, sparked 
so much interests. In this paper, we shall discuss a novel Organisational Information and Knowledge 
Management Model (in Figure 3) which clarifies the differences between information and knowledge; 
provides mechanisms for individual knowledge creation, and information sharing. Here, we take the 
stance on knowledge which, in accordance with the Cognitive Approach (in Section 2.2), resides in our 
conscious  mental  states  or  minds  of  the  knowers  (Davenport  and  Prusak,  1998).  It  has  been 
internalised and is deemed to be meaningful or useful for potential mental or physical actions. On the 
other hand, information is viewed as anything (including knowledge) that is codifiable (embedded in 
documents, repositories, signals in multimedia sources, etc.) and can be transferred. 
Based on the categories of knowledge and their respective attributes which are tabulated in Table 1, we 
categorised three classes of information: coded information which is all explicitly represented (e.g. 
books,  pictures,  icons,  graphs,  images,  etc…);  sensory  information  (relate  to  perception  and 
transmitted through multimedia channels), and practice or art information (relate to skills and doing). 
Different possible conversions within an individual (as shown in Figure 3) are: 
a. information–nothing
A piece of incoming information will either be ignored or rejected when it is identical or 
totally different from an existing mental structure; can neither be understood nor encoded 
(as discussed in Section 2.2 –  Cognitive Approach). This phenomenon could also occur 
when there are tenacious preconceptions, pervasive mental models, appear unintelligible 
appearance,  or  cognitive  load where  the  receiver  has  been bombarded with  too much 
information at one single point in time.
b. information-information
Information could be exaggerated, reduced when only the gist is abstracted. It will remain 
as information in the receiver’s head as long as it is acquired through rote learning without 
being internalised.
c. information-knowledge
Information  is  transformed  into  knowledge  when  reflected  on  (which  effects 
understanding – Dewey, 1960; also see Kolb’s Learning Cycle in Section 2.1), reasoned 
about (Peirce’s deduction, induction and abduction), analysed (the whole is broken into 
parts), comprehended, tested (as in trial and error, or inquired scientifically – in Empirical  
and Pragmatic Approaches), acted out (procedural knowledge), perceived through the 6 
senses and processed mentally (sensory information only), observed and mimicked with 
understanding (art or practice information only).
d. knowledge-information
When knowledge in a knower’s head is expressed and codified then it is transformed into 
information and this is resonated by the following view, ‘knowledge can move down the 
value chain, returning to information and data’ (Davenport and Prusak, 1998).
e. knowledge-knowledge
A new piece of incoming information could effect the following changes in an existing 
knowledge structure: accretion, tuning or structuring (See Schema Change in Section 2.2) 
or restructuring (abandoning the old – Papert, 1980 in Cognitive Approach, Section 2.2).
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Views/Models Key Elements Attributes of Knowledge
Effable Ineffable Codifiable Non-
Codifiable
Perceptual Conceptual Social Personal
Seminal Epistemology
Rationalist Approach Theoretical Knowledge 
(hypotheses)
X X X X
Empiricist Approach Empirical Knowledge
Experiential Knowledge 
(through observations)
Theoretical Knowledge 
(through formulation of 
theories)
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
Pragmatic Approach Pragmatic Knowledge
Experiential Knowledge 
(through observations)
Theoretical Knowledge 
(hypotheses and through 
formulation of theories)
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
Social Approach Cultural Knowledge
Community Knowledge (e.g. 
Scientific Community knowledge)
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
Cognitive Approach
Schema Change
(Rumelhart & Norman, 1977)
Declarative Knowledge
Procedural Knowledge (Maxims 
only)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Theory Change
(Carey, 1985; Vosniadou, 
1995)
Empirical Knowledge
Experiential Knowledge 
(through observations)
Theoretical Knowledge 
(through formulation of 
theories)
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
Table 1: Seminal and Contemporary Epistemologies with Attributes of Knowledge (Part 1)
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Views/Models Key Elements Attributes of Knowledge
Effable Ineffable Codifiable Non-
Codifiable
Perceptual Conceptual Social Personal
Mental Model Change
(Gentner & Stevens, 1983; 
Johnson-Laird, 1983; 
Vosniadou et al. 1999)
Empirical Knowledge
Experiential Knowledge 
(through observations)
Theoretical Knowledge 
(through formulation of 
theories)
X
X
X
X X
X
X
X
Pluralist Epistemology
Dichotomy Model of 
Knowledge
(Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995)
Explicit Knowledge X X X X X
Tacit Knowledge X X X X
Multiple Model of 
Knowledge
Cultural Knowledge (Choo, 1998) X X X X
Proprietary Knowledge (Boisot, 
1995)
X X X X X
Personal Knowledge (Boisot, 1995) X X X X
Public Knowledge (Boisot, 1995) X X X X
Common-sense Knowledge 
(Boisot, 1995)
X X X X X
Conscious Knowledge (Spender, 
1996)
individual explicit knowledge
X X X X
Objectified Knowledge (Spender, 
1996)
organisational explicit 
knowledge
X X X X
Automatic Knowledge (Spender, 
1996)
intuitive knowledge
X X X
Table 1: Seminal and Contemporary Epistemologies with Attributes of Knowledge (Part 2)
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Views/Models Key Elements Attributes of Knowledge
Effable Ineffable Codifiable Non-
Codifiable
Perceptual Conceptual Social Personal
Collective Knowledge (Davenport 
and Prusak, 1998) – organisational 
practical knowledge
maxims (organisational explicit 
knowledge)
individual experience or 
practice (tacit knowledge)
X
X
X
X X
X X
X
Continuum Model of 
Knowledge
(Polanyi, 1967; Leonard et. 
al, 1998)
Conscious Knowledge (Explicit 
Knowledge)
X X X X X
Unconscious Knowledge (Tacit 
Knowledge)
X X X X
Experiential Knowledge (tacit 
Knowledge)
X X X X
Duality Model of Knowledge
(Hildreth et al, 2002)
Hard Knowledge (explicit 
knowledge)
X X X X X
Soft Knowledge (tacit knowledge) X X X X
Knowing Model of 
Knowledge
Know-what
declarative knowledge (explicit 
knowledge)
X X X X X
Know-how 
Procedural knowledge 
(maxims – explicit knowledge)
Procedural knowledge 
(experience – tacit knowledge)
X
X
X
X X
X X X
X
Know-what-it-is-like (tacit 
knowledge)
Experiential knowledge
X X X X
Know-that
Declarative knowledge 
(explicit knowledge)
Propositional knowledge
X X X X X
Table 1: Seminal and Contemporary Epistemologies with Attributes of Knowledge (Part 3)
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Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) view every member in an organisation as knowledge workers where new 
knowledge always begins with an individual.  An organisation ‘learns’ when individuals learn, and 
team learning is viewed as a fundamental unit of a learning organisation. Tsoukas (2005) claims that 
knowledge  becomes  organisational  ‘knowledge’ simply  by  it  being  generated  or  developed,  or 
transmitted by individuals within the organisation through knowledge creating activities.  However, 
based on our information and knowledge conversions, everything that is transferable is information 
(effable  and codifiable)  so in our view, that there could only be organisational  information in the 
physical or virtual environment while its collective knowledge resides in individual’s heads. Some of 
the  information sharing mechanisms among individuals  in  a  group,  are  through the  typical  easily 
coded and communicated forms, instruction, conferences, meetings, workshops, collaborative inquiry, 
collaborative  projects  or  problem  solving.  However,  sensory  information,  and  art  or  practice 
information can only be shared through multimedia communication channels, narratives, analogies, 
metaphors,  maxims or rules of the thumb (Davenport and Prusak, 1998),  the setting up of similar 
environments for re-enacting the intended experience, highlight or ascribe modality (e.g. very great, 
great, same, small, very small) to the salient and critical aspects of qualitative phenomenal features 
known as qualia (Hubbard, 1996). However, sharing of information (individual-individual, individual-
group, group-group) requires common language, negotiated or shared meaning, shared mental models, 
integration of perspectives or views (mentioned by Senge, 1990). 
In the organisational information and knowledge management model,  the Communities of Practice 
within the organisation is said to subsume groups or teams. The practice component in Communities 
of Practice (CoP) assumes a situated meaning, which is only meaningful when there is active social 
participation (Wenger, 1998) that often entails conflicts, negotiations, collaboration, etc…which form 
the bases of shared understanding (Seely Brown and Duguid, 1991). Generally, CoPs consist of shared 
trusts, belief, learned lessons, insights, narratives, anecdotes, and values which give its members, a 
sense of identity (Liebowitz, 2001; Seely Brown and Duguid, 1991; Tsoukas, 2005), and is central to 
the  social  construction  as  well  as  sustenance  of  soft knowledge  (Kimble  et.  al,  2002).  If  an 
organisation values knowledge creation and information sharing, then it should provide a conducive 
ground to facilitate  the growth and continuous improvement of  CoP (McDermott,  1999)  which if 
sustained, will be institutionalised (Tsoukas, 2005).
Lastly,  according  to  Senge  (1990),  engineering  knowledge  is  created  when  a  new idea  has  been 
invented  and  proven  to  work  in  a  controlled  environment  (e.g.  laboratory  in  the  Research  and 
Development Department). The Kuhn paradigm shift phenomenon will occur when the testing of an 
idea is followed by an invention, when replicated on a large scale, becomes innovation which will 
revolutionise the organisational business model, processes and operations. 
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Figure  4  illustrates  the  information  and  knowledge  cycle,  which  is  an  abridged  form  of  the 
organisational information and knowledge management model shown in Figure 3. It entails creation, 
application,  codification,  and  transfer  activities.  When  created  knowledge  is  coded,  it  becomes 
information  which  can  then  be  communicated  and  shared.  Information  sharing  mechanisms  are 
processes (i), (ii), and (iii) in Figure 3, which will facilitate schema change (Rummelhart and Norman, 
1977) or cognitive growth (Piaget). When knowledge has been proven over time, and information is 
stable then, it could be disseminated to other organisations using the same transfer processes within 
the organisation and this is known as information diffusion.
4. Conclusion
In our discussion we have demonstrated how the seminal and contemporary epistemologies could be 
synergised for the benefit of an organisation. In figure 3, it  shows that knowledge creation within 
individuals  happens  when  there  are  information  and  knowledge  conversions  (within  individuals) 
facilitated by reflection, reasoning, testing, acting out, perception, apprenticeship, and etc… In order 
to promote information and knowledge management,  an organisation must  provide incentives and 
motivation for individuals to create knowledge through continual learning, codifying information in 
multi-modal  representations,  providing  the  diverse  means  and  resources  for  information  sharing 
between: an individual and another individual; an individual or a group; a group and another group. 
This is followed by information diffusion. This paper has also presented an Organisational Information 
and Knowledge Management  Model  which distinguishes  the  differences  between  information  and 
knowledge, as well as mechanisms for the conversions between information and knowledge. For our 
future  work,  we  will  validate  and  revise  this  model  by  using  it  to  investigate  ways  by  which 
individuals as well as groups create knowledge and share information within an organisation.
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